Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 47
Number 1 Fall 2013

Article 4

Fall 2013

Table of Contents

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr

Recommended Citation
Table of Contents, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol47/iss1/4

This Table of Contents is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 4 Side A

09/23/2014 13:40:53

TABLE OF CONTENTS

9/12/2014 6:48 PM

LOYOLA

LAW REVIEW Ň LOS ANGELES
FALL 2013

VOLUME 47

NUMBER 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLES

09/23/2014 13:40:53

C M
Y K

35551-lla_47-1 Sheet No. 4 Side A

FUNDING FAVORED SONS AND DAUGHTERS: NONPROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS
AND
“EXTRAORDINARY
RESTITUTION”
IN
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL CASES
by Paul J. Larkin, Jr. ................................................................................ 1
Over the past eight years, the federal government has entered into more
than two hundred nonprosecution agreements with corporations in
white-collar crime cases. In such agreements the government promises
to cease its investigation and forego any potential charges so long as the
corporation agrees to certain terms. And there’s the rub: given the
economic realities of just being charged with a white-collar crime these
days, corporations are more than willing to accept nonprosecution
agreements. Prosecutors are cognizant of this willingness, as well as of
the fact that these agreements are practically insulated from judicial
review. This results in the prosecution possessing a seemingly
unfettered discretion in choosing the terms of a nonprosecution
agreement. The breadth of this discretion is nowhere more apparent
than in environmental criminal cases. Nonprosecution agreements in
such cases have begun to require corporations to donate monetarily to a
nonprofit of the government’s choosing. Indeed, in 2012 British
Petroleum agreed to pay more than $2.394 billion to nonprofit agencies.
This Article critiques this practice by highlighting the inconsistencies
between nonprosecution agreements and plea bargaining—the latter are
subject to judicial review while the former are not—and unearthing the
differences between these payments and any common-law
understanding of restitutionary principles. The Article then suggests that
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the practical result of these nonprosecution agreements is that
prosecutors are diverting money that ought to be paid to the Treasury to
government-chosen nonprofit agencies, a power constitutionally granted
to legislative actors. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting a
modest reform: judicial review by a United States magistrate judge, so
as not to run into any Article III concerns, to ensure that prosecutors do
not take advantage of the nonprosecution-agreement process.
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EAGLES, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
by Kathryn E. Kovacs ............................................................................. 53
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act prohibits the taking or
possession of eagles and eagle parts. Recognizing the centrality of
eagles in many Native American religions, Congress carved out an
exception to that prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian
tribes.” The problems with the administration of that exception are
reaching crisis proportions. At the Fish and Wildlife Service’s National
Eagle Repository, which collects dead eagles from around the country
and distributes them to members of federally recognized Indian tribes,
more than six thousand tribal members are on a waiting list for eagles.
That list grows each year. Frustration with the current system feeds a
burgeoning black market that threatens the viability of eagle
populations. Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is being met: eagles are
not adequately protected, and tribal religious needs are not satisfied.
Scholarship in this area has neither fully elucidated the cross-cutting
tensions in the administration of the Eagle Act nor prescribed a realistic
solution. This Article fills that gap. First, the Article examines a series
of tensions: between species preservation and religious freedom;
between accommodating the religious needs of tribal members and not
accommodating others with the same religious needs; within the case
law itself; and between the government’s effort to accommodate tribal
religion and the deep dissatisfaction of the tribal community. This
Article then proposes a solution: changing the Fish and Wildlife
Service’s administration of the exception from permitting individuals to
permitting tribes and ultimately turning over much of the administration
of the Indian tribes exception to the tribes acting collectively. The
Article explains how scholarship on indigenous cultural property,
community property solutions to the tragedy of the commons, and tribal
self-determination supports this proposal. Finally, the Article shows
how this proposal will alleviate some of the tension in the
administration of the Eagle Act’s Indian tribes exception.
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THE MYRIAD REASONS TO HIT “RESET” ON PATENT-ELIGIBILITY
JURISPRUDENCE
by Alan J. Heinrich & Christopher T. Abernethy.................................. 117
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Association
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. in the historical context
of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, including the broad, judicially created
“exceptions” to the statute which exclude “laws of nature, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas” from patent eligibility. The authors posit
that the Myriad decision was a significant departure from the Court’s prior
jurisprudence regarding patent-eligible subject matter. The authors
welcome this departure and contend that Myriad more accurately adhered
to the letter and the spirit of § 101 than did many of the Court’s prior
rulings. The authors further propose that Myriad’s bright-line test for patent
eligibility can provide a foundation for a clear and workable framework,
grounded firmly in statute, that would at last bring order and consistency to
an area of patent law that has long been riddled with confusion and
uncertainty.
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A RIGHT TO REMAIN PSYCHOTIC? A NEW STANDARD FOR INVOLUNTARY
TREATMENT IN LIGHT OF CURRENT SCIENCE
by Elizabeth Bennion ............................................................................ 251
Mass shootings, such as the killing of school children and staff in
Newtown, Connecticut, have provided brutal reminders of inadequacies
in our nation’s mental health system. In the wake of these shootings,
President Obama asserted that “[w]e are going to need to work on
making access to mental health care as easy as access to a gun.” But
what should society do when the person needing mental health
treatment refuses care—when the problem is not rooted in access but in
free will? When is involuntary treatment justified? In deciding whether
to forcibly medicate, multiple interests come into play, including patient
autonomy, public safety, and the patient’s medical welfare. As a
society, we have overemphasized patient autonomy and
underemphasized patient welfare to the detriment not only of the
patient’s well-being but also of public safety—and even to the
detriment of patient autonomy itself. This Article briefly examines the
history of the involuntary treatment debate and how society arrived at
the present imbalance. It then considers the implications of current
scientific research on the brain and the nature of severe mental illness,
using schizophrenia as an illustrative example. The Article explains
how current involuntary treatment standards could be revised to reflect
this scientific understanding and continue protecting a patient’s civil
rights without making undue sacrifices of the patient’s long-term health
and well-being. It also defends the proposed new standard against
potential constitutional challenges.
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The new standard would allow involuntary treatment for a limited
number of years after onset of severe psychotic symptoms under
specified conditions. It would also provide for more access to medical
information by patients’ immediate family members and primary
caretakers. The standard reflects (1) research showing the vital
importance of early treatment for long-term prognosis and prevention of
irreversible injury to the brain; (2) statistics suggesting the particular
vulnerability of a maturing brain; (3) a respect for autonomy and the
patient’s ultimate agency to reject treatment if no satisfactory treatment
option can be found; (4) consideration of factors that uniquely affect
autonomy concerns when patients are severely psychotic; and (5)
research demonstrating that family involvement can greatly benefit
treatment outcomes. Because brain science is currently an area of
explosive growth and discovery, this Article recognizes that any
involuntary treatment standard will need to be continually re-examined
and revised in light of scientific progress.

NOTES
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WHAT’S IN A NAME? A CASE FOR INCLUDING BIOMETRIC IDENTIFIERS ON
ARREST WARRANTS
by Ryan Webb ........................................................................................ 319
Too often, innocent individuals sharing the same name and physical
characteristics as the subject of an arrest warrant are misidentified and
mistakenly held by law enforcement. The use of biometric identifiers,
commonly known as fingerprint identification numbers, would help
reduce the number of false arrests because a person’s fingerprints are
entirely unique to that individual. Hearkening back to 1894, the
Supreme Court’s prevailing interpretation of the particularity
requirement of arrest warrants mandates only that the warrant include a
subject’s name or general physical description. With such a low
threshold to establish a facially valid warrant, law enforcement officers
are essentially immunized from civil liability and mistakenly arrested
individuals are without legal recourse. Such consequences do not accord
with the Fourth Amendment’s “right of the people to be secure in their
persons.” This Note argues that biometric identifiers, which have been
used in law enforcement and have the ability to singularly identify the
actual subject of an arrest warrant, should be included on arrest
warrants. This embellishment of the “particularity” standard faithfully
accords with the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment and would
advance the rights of individuals who are wrongly arrested.
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THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S UNBOUNDED CONCEPTION OF INHERENCY IN
PATENT LAW
by Matthew Kaiser ................................................................................ 345
This Note examines the doctrine of inherency in patent law, which
relates to the Patent Act’s novelty requirement, and—theoretically—
seeks to ensure that inventions that are already within the public domain
are not wrenched away from the public through a later patent grant.
Unfortunately, a lack of recent Supreme Court guidance and a conflict
within the Federal Circuit concerning what is necessary to prove
inherency have led to a confusing and unpredictable body of inherency
law. This Note begins by outlining the increased concern for uniformity
and predictability in patent law; it then traces the early treatment of
inherent anticipation by the Supreme Court, as well as the Federal
Circuit and its predecessor court. Next, it argues that the Federal
Circuit’s more recent inherency jurisprudence has expanded the scope of
inherency, particularly with respect to patents covering pharmaceuticals,
introducing dangerous and costly unpredictability into the patent system.
Finally, it proposes a common-sense solution aimed at abrogating the
current boundless conception of inherency in order to allow patent law
and inherency to perform their central functions: to provide
predictability and ensure the important patent policy of rewarding new
inventions that are not already within the public domain.
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